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ABSTRACT: Accounting conservatism has significantly increased over the last several 
decades, but little is known about causes for these changes. I find that the overall 
increase in conservatism is largely driven by a subset of young firms rather than old 
firms in the firm population. I then examine whether the different conservatism trends 
between old and young firms are due to changes in accounting standards, changes in 
demand for conservatism, or changes in firm’s economic environments. My evidence 
suggests that the adoption of new accounting standards is responsible for changes in 
conservatism as most prior studies expect, but changes in demand for conservatism 
driven by the passage of regulations also play an important role in explaining 
conservatism trends. In contrast, changes in economic environments seem to have had 
little effect on conservatism. 
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The literature suggests an increase in “accounting conservatism”, such that earnings 
increasingly reflect bad news more timely than good news (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; 
Ryan and Zarowin, 2003; Watts, 2003b). These studies address possible sources that 
might result in the observed trend in conservatism. Givoly and Hayn (2000) attribute 
increasing conservatism to increasing legal liability, while Ryan and Zarowin (2003) 
provide preliminary evidence that accounting might be the primary reason for the 
increasing asymmetry. Watts (2003b) also partially attributes the trend to the FASB 
management of standards while calling for time-series studies that might provide an 
answer to this question. However, these studies largely leave the task of exploring the 
factors to future research, and do not explicitly examine causes for the changes in 
conservatism. In this study, I extend the literature by identifying why conservatism has 
increased over time. In the paper I: 
(i) investigate who, if any, has driven the overall trend in accounting conservatism; 
(ii) examine why conservatism of subsamples has differently changed over time 
Based on prior literature, I identify three non-exclusive sources that can lead to 
changes in conservatism: changes in the accounting standards, changes in demand for 
conservatism, and changes in the incidence of economic events. Considering the 
continued increase in conservatism, understanding the factors that are attributable to the 
observed increase in conservative reporting is of fundamental importance to researchers, 
financial statement users, and standard-setters for the following reasons.  




accounting (Sterling, 1970; Watts, 2003a), known to affect accounting practice for a 
long time. Despite its importance, few studies examine the reasons why conservatism 
not only existed but only prospered for so long (Watts, 2003a). Therefore, answering to 
this question could potentially provide valuable insights into the properties of 
conservatism. 
Second, the three possible sources of changes in conservatism have different policy 
implications. If firms make more conservative reporting choices due to changes in 
accounting standards as most prior studies expect, standard setters should consider 
practical impacts of GAAP and feel greater responsibility to manage GAAP 
requirements. Alternatively, if changes in demand for conservatism are responsible for 
the trend, it implies that firms effectively choose the degree of accounting conservatism 
in consideration of the associated benefits. Or if changes in the incidence of economic 
events are responsible, then changes in conservatism are natural results of the reflection 
of firm’s underlying economic activities. If the latter two are the case, regulators who 
deal with agenda associated to conservatism should properly understand the effects of 
managerial incentive and economic events on conservative reporting. 
I respond to Ryan and Zarowin (2003), who call for more research on the causes of 
the increasing asymmetry over time, and also respond to Watts (2003b), who call for a 
time-series analysis on the effects of changes in GAAP or changes in taxes and 
regulation on conservatism.  
Motivated by Srivastava (2014) who attribute the decline in earnings quality to 




increase in conservatism could also be at least partially driven by changes in the 
composition of firm population. Specifically, old firms (those listed before 1979) and 
young firms (those listed on or after 1979) are likely to have different conservatism 
trends for two reasons. First, Fama and French (2004) document that the profile of firms 
has dramatically changed since 1979. They find newly listed firms to be relatively small 
firms with low survival rates and poor performance, but with high growth prospects. 
Given the significantly different firm characteristics, two types of companies could 
show different conservatism trends as well. Second, the existing conservatism literature 
finds that accounting conservatism varies with firm age. Khan and Watts (2009) 
suggests that younger firms make more conservative reporting in order to mitigate 
agency problems associated with information asymmetry. 
By estimating annual cross-sectional regression based on Basu (1997) for the period 
1980-2012, I show that conservatism of young firms has increased while that of old 
firms shows no apparent trend. In addition, the trends of two groups are significantly 
different as I directly compare trend line slope of old and young firms. This result 
suggests that the increasing trend in conservatism documented by prior literature is 
largely driven by a subset of groups that consist of young, small, and growing firms. 
Next, I examine whether the different conservatism trends between old and young 
firms are primarily driven by changes in accounting standards, changes in demand for 
conservatism, or changes in the incidence of economic events. I first explore the first 
two explanations together. I begin with identifying accounting standards that are likely 




related to restructuring activities are likely to have greater impact on old firms due to 
their size, while standards related to impairment loss recognition of intangible assets are 
likely to have greater impact on young firms due to their higher intangible intensity. I 
also identify changes in regulation such as PSLRA and SOX that occurred in the same 
period as GAAP changes as those regulation changes are also known to have affected 
financial reporting conservatism (Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Seetharaman et al. 2005). By 
comparing my conservatism measure before and after the event period, I find that the 
adoption of accounting standards is responsible for the increase in conservatism in 1986 
and 2002. However, in 1995, PSLRA significantly reduces legal liability of managers 
and auditors and results in more aggressive financial reporting than before, especially 
for old firms who were exposed to greater litigation concern. This is surprising 
considering the adoption of two accounting standards that are likely to require more 
conservative reporting in 1995. Thus, this result provides evidence that changes in 
accounting standards play a role in explaining changes in conservatism as most prior 
studies expect, but changes in managerial reporting incentive also play an important role, 
even offsetting the effect of GAAP changes in 1995. 
I then examine whether the different trends in the incidence of adverse economic 
events explain conservatism trends of old and young firms. Following Donelson et al. 
(2011), I identify such economic events using four variables: negative employee growth; 
discontinued operations; operating losses; and negative revenue growth. I construct a 
comprehensive index by combining four variables, and include it in the Basu (1997) 




associated with conservatism, presumably because those apparent negative signals of 
firm’s economic status force firms to report in a more conservative way. I then examine 
how the frequency of economic events has changed over time for old and young firms. 
The result shows that young firms experience more decreasing trend in Escore than old 
firms, results that are not consistent with conservatism trends. Therefore, the third 
explanation contributes little to the conservatism trend over the past several decades. 
This study makes a number of important contributions. First, the results indicate that 
the significant increase in conservatism is driven primarily by newly listed firms in the 
firm population, rather than by existing firms. Second, I provide evidence that changes 
in accounting standards as well as changes in the demand for conservatism play an 
important role in explaining conservatism trends. To my knowledge, this is the first finer 
tests that make an attempt to discriminate among potential explanations of changes in 
conservatism. Third, the results also indicate that changes in economic environment play 
little role in explaining changes in conservatism. 
Thus, this study provides integrated research on accounting conservatism trend. 
Previous time-series analysis on conservatism documents an increasing trend in 
conservatism but leave the task of identifying the specific reasons for future studies. On 
the other hand, prior cross-sectional analysis focuses on finding factors that affect 
conservatism but does not examine them in a time-series manner. I incorporate both 
time-series and cross-sectional analysis in identifying why financial reporting has 
become more conservative over time. In this sense, I expect this study to provide 






2. CHANGES IN THE ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM 
In this section, I test whether accounting conservatism has increased over time by 
using more recent time-series data than do most prior studies. I use 126,612 firm-year 
observations extracted from the intersection of CRSP and Compustat for the years 1980-
2012. All data definitions are presented in the appendix. Annual returns are calculated 
by cumulating monthly returns starting from the fourth month after the fiscal year-end to 
exclude the market response to the previous year’s earnings (Hayn, 1995; Basu, 1997).  
I delete firm years with missing data for any of the variables used in estimation. I also 
eliminate observations in the extreme 1 percent of the distribution each year of current 
earnings, current returns, size, leverage, and market-to-book ratio. Finally, I exclude all 
finance firms as those firms are expected to exhibit a different association between 
earnings and returns due to unique institutional and regulatory factors (Givoly and Hayn, 
2000; Ryan and Zarowin, 2003). Thus, I exclude Fama-French industries identified by 
numbers 44-47. 
Next, I estimate annual cross-sectional regression based on Basu (1997) which 
defines conservatism as “anticipate no profits but anticipate all losses”. To control for 
the expected component of earnings and returns, I include a number of additional 
variables in Basu (1997) regression. This is important because I try to capture how 
timely unexpected returns are reflected in unexpected earnings and because the 




(Patatoukas and Thomas, 2011; Ball and Easton, 2013). The regression model is as 
follows: 
    =    +       +       +          + controls +                        (1) 
where     is current earnings for firm i for year t, divided by market value at year t-1, 
   	is a dummy variable for firm i in year t, equal to 1 when    <0 and equal to 0 
otherwise, and controls includes proxies for expected earnings such as lagged sales 
revenue and lagged earnings, and proxies for expected returns such as log of beginning-
of-year market capitalization, log of beginning-of-year share price, beginning-of-year 
book-to-market ratio, and beginning-of-year debt to equity ratio.    is the measure of 
good news timeliness, and    is the measure of accounting conservatism, representing 
the incremental timeliness for bad news over good news. 
Annual average coefficients for the full sample are reported in Table 1 for the years 
1980-2012, while results are plotted in Figure 1. To show the time trends of each 
coefficient, I also report the results of regression of the 33 annual coefficients on the 
year.   , the timeliness for good news, has dramatically decreased from 0.032 in 1980-
1987 to -0.004 in 2004-2012. The time trend coefficient is significantly negative at -
0.002 (t = -3.73; p < 0.01). On the other hand,   , the incremental response to bad news, 
has consistently increased from 0.223 in 1980-1987 to 0.276 in 2004-201, yielding 
positive time trend (t = 1.70; p < 0.1). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The results reported in Table 1 are consistent with those documented by prior studies. 




the net downward effect on the contemporaneous association between stock returns and 
earnings (Francis and Shipper, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Ely and Waymire, 1999; 
Ryan and Zarowin, 2003; Srivastava, 2014). More importantly, the patterns indicate a 
significant increase in accounting conservatism. 
In the next section I examine who, if any, is responsible for the significant increase in 
conservative reporting documented in this section. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3. WHO DRIVES THE OVERALL TREND IN 
CONSERVATISM? 
Srivastava (2014) documents that overall decline in earnings quality is largely due to 
changes in the sample of firms in that newly listed firms increasing uncertainty in their 
financial reporting by using large amounts of intangible investments,. Although specific 
reasons may differ, the observed trend in conservatism could also be driven by changes 
in the composition of firm population. Specifically, I hypothesize that old and young 
firms are likely to exhibit different trends in conservative reporting for two reasons. First, 
Fama and French (2004) document that the profile of firms has dramatically changed 
since 1979. They find young firms who were listed on or after 1979 to be relatively 
small firms with low survival rates and poor performance but with high growth 
prospects. Second, the existing conservatism literature finds that conservatism varies 
with firm age. Among them, Khan and Watts (2009) documents that younger firms make 




information asymmetry and because conservatism is an efficient tool for reducing 
agency costs associated with information asymmetry. Taken together, old and young 
firms are likely to have systematically different conservatism trend owing to their 
different characteristics.. 
In my study, all firms who listed before 1979 are classified as “old firms” (Fama and 
French, 2004), while the remaining firms are classified as “young firms”. Table 2 reports 
descriptive statistics (Panel A) and industry composition (panel B) of old and young 
firms for comparison. In line with prior studies, young firms are relatively small and 
unprofitable compared to old firms (-6.4% versus 3.2% for ROA; 4.956 versus 5.235 for 
Size). However, average growth rate of young firms is almost three times higher than 
that of old firms (0.301 versus 0.102 for Sales_Growth), indicating that young firms 
have experienced rapid growth over the last several decades. In addition, old firms 
(young firms) are characterized by higher capital intensity (intangible intensity) than the 
other group. All the variables in Panel A are significantly different between two groups 
at the 1% level.  
Panel B in Table 2 also shows that material-intensive industries such as utilities, 
machinery, gas, and construction materials are the most represented industries for old 
firms (Panel B), while knowledge-intensive industries such as computers, electronic 
equipment, business services are the most represented industries for young firms 
(Srivastava, 2014). Taken together, the results highlight dramatically different 
characteristics and industry composition between old and young firms. In the next 




time and who, if any, is responsible for the documented increase in conservatism. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Empirical analysis 
In this subsection, I start with an analysis of the trend in conservatism for old and 
young firms respectively. Each group’s yearly and three sub-period results for the 
coefficients    and    in equation (1) are presented in Table 3, Panel A, and are 
depicted visually in Figure 2. I also report time trend coefficients and t-statistics to show 
overall change in the degree of conservatism of two groups of firms. 
An inspection of Figure 2 and Table 3 reveals that the timeliness for positive news 
(  ) has significantly decreased over the several decades only for young firms. In case 
of young firms, the coefficient peaked in 1981 (at 0.081) and declined during the rest of 
the study period. Time trend for this group is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
On the other hand, in case of old firms, the coefficient decreases in the 1980s and 1990s 
but increases in 2000s, yielding insignificant time trend. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The proxy for the incremental timeliness for bad news relative to good news (  ) 
also reveals different patterns for old and young firms. For young firms, the coefficient 
has significantly increased, with positive time trend coefficient at 0.006 (t = 3.58; p < 
0.01), even more dramatic increase compared to the overall trend observed in Table 1. 
However, the coefficient shows no apparent trend for old firms, yielding insignificant 




average firms in the firm population. Only young firms are responsible for the changes 
in the timeliness of good and bad news toward more conservative reporting. 
To evaluate whether the time trends of conservatism for old and young firms are 
significantly different, I estimate the following time-series regression, with one 
observation per year from 1980 to 2012: 
C_Scoret =    + γ Trendt +   DummyYoungt +   DummyYoungt × Trendt +   ,(2) 
where  _       is    coefficients obtained from annual regression of equation (1) 
for old and young firms at year t (as reported in Panel A of Table 3), Trendt is a variable 
that goes from 1 (for 1980) to 33 (for 2012), and            	is a dummy variable 
in year t, equal to 1 for young firms and 0 otherwise. Thus, I use 66 group-year 
observations to estimate this regression, and the Trendt variable is included to capture 
time trend of old firms. More importantly, I include an interaction term between dummy 
for young firms and time trend variable because my objective is to compare the 
conservatism trends between two groups, not to compare the level of conservatism. 
Hence, the coefficient on the interaction term represents the differences in the 
conservatism trend line slope between old and young firms. This coefficient is predicted 
to be positive because young firms exhibit increasing trend in conservatism while old 
firms exhibit no apparent time trend. The question is whether the difference in trends 
captured by this coefficient is statistically significant to make the analysis meaningful. 
The results from estimating Equation (2) is presented in Table 3, Panel B. The first 
column shows that the coefficient on the Trendt variable that gauges the conservatism 




firm group as shown in Panel A.  
As predicted, the DummyYoungt × Trendt coefficient, which captures the difference 
in conservatism trend slope between the two types of company, is positive (0.006) and 
significant (t = 2.42; p < 0.05). The sum of two coefficients,    +   , which represents 
the trend line slope for young firms, is significantly positive (0.005; p < 0.01) as shown 
in F-test. The results indicate that young firms have experienced increasing 
conservatism trend that is significantly different from old firms’, although the level of 
conservatism is much lower for young firms (   = -0.170; p < 0.01). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Taken together, the results provide direct evidence that there are meaningful 
differences between young and old firms’ conservatism trends over the past several 
decades. The upward trend in conservatism documented in Table 1 is primarily driven 
by younger firms in the firm population. In the next sections, I investigate what makes 
these two groups of firms to show different accounting conservatism trends. 
 
4. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT 
CONSERVATISM TREND BETWEEN OLD AND YOUNG 
FIRMS 
The results presented in the previous section indicate that young firms drive the 
overall increase in accounting conservatism over the last several decades. This raises the 




conservative while that of old firms has not? What drives the difference in conservatism 
trends between old and young firms? 
 
4.1 Three possible sources of the changes in conservatism 
In general there are three potential reasons for the changes in accounting 
conservatism over time. First, changes in accounting standards could increase 
accounting conservatism either by requiring firms to more timely record certain costs in 
response to bad news or by providing more specific guidance than before to ensure 
compliance with the standards. For example, a standard that first requires firms to 
disclose material restructuring activities coupled with a later statement that provides 
specific guidance for the recognition result in a dramatic increase in the recognition of 
restructuring liabilities and costs in the 1980s and 1990s. I discuss accounting standards 
that are likely to be related to conservatism below.  
Second, changes in demand for conservatism could either increase or decrease 
conservatism even when there is no change in the accounting standards. It is impossible 
for accounting standards to cover every practical case. Thus, financial reporting choice 
inevitably involves a subjective judgment to an extent and incentives of managers and 
auditors play critical role in making such judgments. For example, if corporate debt 
increases, managers may choose to make more conservative reporting in order to avoid 
debt covenant violations. Also, if auditor’s litigation burden linked to financial reporting 
declines, he/she may allow firm manager to report more aggressively. 




even when there has been neither change in GAAP nor change in the demand for 
conservatism. For example, when there is not only bad news but also negative signals 
about firm’s underlying economics such as operating losses or sales declines, managers 
and auditors are more likely to be forced to report conservatively under the GAAP 
requirements regardless of their intentions. 
Ex ante, it is not clear which sources, among these three factors, are primarily 
responsible for the trends in conservatism documented in Table 3. To discriminate 
among these explanations, I sequentially examine three non-exclusive explanations for 
the conservatism trends in the following sections. 
 
4.2 Changes in accounting standards and changes in the demand for 
conservatism 
Prior time-series studies on conservatism suggest that the significant increase in 
conservatism is primarily, or at least partially attributable to accounting standards (Ryan 
and Zarowin, 2003; Watts, 2003b). However, none of the studies explicitly investigate 
the effect of GAAP changes on conservatism (Watts, 2003b). This study differs from 
Donelson et al. (2011) who document that a decline in the revenue-expense relation is 
attributable to an increase in special items which is in turn attributable to more frequent 
economic events. Accounting conservatism includes the recognition of special items in 
response to bad news, but is more comprehensive concept that also includes early 
recognition of general expenses (i.e. R&D expense), delayed recognition of revenue, etc. 




effect of newly listed firms.  
Although accounting standards that can lead to more conservative reporting are 
adopted, not all standards have equal impact on each firm. How much influence 
accounting standards have on financial reporting depends on each firm’s business 
structure and accounting method choice. To examine whether changes in accounting 
standards has contributed to the different trend in conservatism for old and young firms, 
I first identify the newly adopted or amended standards that are likely to have had 
impact on financial reporting conservatism during my sample period.  
First, SAB 67 and EITF 94-3, standards that are related to corporate restructuring, 
were adopted in 1986 and 1995 respectively. SAB 67 requires that restructurings be 
disclosed separately if material, while EITF 94-3 provides guidance for the first time on 
the recognition of a liability and expense associated with restructuring activities. 
Because restructuring is perceived to improve corporate governance mechanism (John et 
al., 1992), reporting restructuring as a separate line item becomes popular in 1980s and 
1990s. Considering that restructuring is often motivated by market pressures to change 
poor organizations (Brickley and Drunen, 1990), it is likely to increase conditional 
conservatism by lowering reported earnings in negative returns period. The literature on 
corporate restructuring documents that many large public firms frequently undertook 
restructuring during the 1980s by downsizing or divesting major lines of business 
(Bowman and Singh, 1990; Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). Thus, I hypothesize that these 
standards might have had greater impact on old firms relative to young firms. 




estimation of assets. Among them, SFAS 121 is the first standard to explicitly mention 
asset write-offs that was effective in 1996 with early adoption in 1995 “encouraged”, 
requiring long-lived assets and certain intangibles to be reviewed for recoverability if 
there is any indication of impairment and to be reported at the lower value amount. Later, 
SFAS 142 (effective in 2002) eliminated goodwill amortization, requiring instead that 
goodwill be evaluated yearly for possible impairment (Ramanna, 2008; Jarva, 2010). 
Before the adoption of SFAS 142, goodwill was evenly amortized over a set period 
regardless of the incidence of economic events. In contrast, under SFAS 142, firms 
recognize no expenses during the good news period, but they have to recognize 
impairment costs if goodwill is evaluated to be impaired during the bad news period, 
resulting in the increase in conditional conservatism. 
 Since both SFAS 121 and 142 become operative when negative economic events 
such as a current period or a history of operating loss occur, high-technology firms are 
affected to a greater degree by these standards (Chandra, 2011). In this sense, I predict 
conservatism of young firms may increase more than that of old firms after the adoption 
of these two standards because young firms experience operating losses much more 
frequently as shown in Table 2. In sum, I identify the adoption and the amendment of 
accounting standards occurred in 1986, 1995, and 2002.  
However, accounting standards provide only general guidance for how firms should 
make financial reporting, rather than providing customized guidance for every case 
firms face. Thus, subjective judgments of firm managers and auditors are unavoidable in 




firms to conduct annual impairment testing of goodwill, it leaves an estimation of fair 
values for goodwill to the firm’s discretions to an extent, enabling managers to adjust 
the timing of impairment recognition or even avoid such recognition (Rockness et al., 
2001; Watts, 2003a). Thus, managers may choose to recognize impairment costs if they 
have incentives to report conservatively due to high litigation risk or high leverage that 
is linked to agency conflicts. In contrast, managers may not recognize impairment costs 
if they have incentives to adjust earnings upward. Hence, manager’s and auditor’s 
demand for conservatism can either strengthen or weaken the effects of accounting 
standards on actual financial reporting.  
The conservatism theory in Watts (2003a) and related empirical studies (e.g., Lafond 
and Watts, 2008) suggest that conservatism varies with four types of demand: 
contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation demand. For example, firms have greater 
demand for conservatism if they have many debt and compensation contracts that are 
associated with accounting numbers, a high probability of litigation, high present value 
of taxes to be paid, and high potential political costs (Watts, 2003a). Therefore, it is 
important to consider not only the effects of accounting standards but also the effects of 
changes in the demand for conservatism in order to properly examine the causes for the 
observed conservatism trend.  
However, it is difficult to constitute a reliable measure of the demand for 
conservatism. Although Khan and Watts (2009) use a set of firm characteristics 
including size, leverage, and the market-to-book ratio as proxies for the demand for 




characteristics are subject to potential endogeneity problems that are difficult to address. 
Thus, rather than tracing the trend of each firm’s demand for conservatism, I examine 
the effects of exogenous shocks that are known to have had impact on conservatism. To 
do so, I additionally identify two such regulation changes that occur during my study 
period. 
First, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 eliminated joint 
and several liabilities under which auditors and other related parties could be named to 
lawsuits. Seetharaman et al. (2005) provide evidence that accounting conservatism 
decreased after the passage of PSLRA, presumably due to the reduced litigation risk 
imposed on managers and auditors. Second, there’s evidence that financial reporting 
becomes more conservative following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the resulting 
certification requirement by SEC of 2002 (Lobo and Zhou, 2006). Since larger firms are 
generally exposed to higher litigation risk (Khan and Watts, 2009), the impact of these 
two regulation changes on conservatism is expected to be more salient for old firms than 
young firms.  
Table 4, Panel A, summarizes the descriptions of each accounting standard and 
regulation along with its hypothesized effect on conservatism. Across 1986 and 2002, 
accounting conservatism is predicted to increase because both accounting standards and 
regulation changes are likely to result in more conservative reporting. However, in a 
period where accounting standards and regulation are expected to have opposite impact 
on conservatism, how conservatism changes is an empirical question. Thus, it will allow 




[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Empirical analysis 
To examine whether the implementation of the standards and the passage of laws 
described above explain the documented trend in conservatism of old and young firms, I 
first estimate pooled cross-sectional regressions of equation (1) over four sub-periods, 
1980-1985, 1986-1994, 1995-2001, and 2002-2012. The results are reported in Table 4, 
Panel B. Following the adoption of SAB 67 in 1986, accounting conservatism increases 
for both old and young firms. The magnitude of an increase is greater for old firms 
(0.097) than young firms (0.067), indicating that the standard on restructuring has 
greater impact on large firms as expected. 
The results for the changes in conservatism around 1995 are somewhat surprising. 
From the second to the third sub-period, the old firms’ coefficient that captures the 
incremental response to bad news than good news declines by nearly one-third, from 
0.335 to 0.227. In contrast, the coefficient of young firms remains almost the same, from 
0.209 for the second sub-period to 0.210 for the third sub-period. This result is 
interesting given that two accounting standards that are likely to increase conservative 
reporting were also adopted in 1995. Thus, the reduced litigation risk following PSLRA 
seems to play an important role in accounting conservatism, even to the extent of 
offsetting the effect of GAAP that requires more conservative reporting. The impact of 
PSLRA is more pronounced for old firms who have greater litigation concerns 
consistent with my prediction. 




old and young firms. This result is attributable to both SFAS 145 and SOX, though I 
cannot separate the effect of each event on conservatism. The increase in conservatism is 
slightly greater for young firms, likely due to more frequent negative economic events 
that result in recognizing asset impairment.  
I next perform the multivariate regression analysis using the following extended 
model of Basu (1997): 
      =    +       +       +      ×     +    86 +    95 +    86 
+    86 ×     +    95 ×    +    02 ×      
+     86 ×     +     95 ×     +     02 ×      
+     86 ×     ×     +     95 ×     ×     +     02 ×     ×      
+ controls +                                                     (4) 
where D86, D95, and D02 are indicator variables that take the value of 1 for all years 
from 1986, 1995, 2002 and later, and 0 otherwise, while other variables are as defined 
earlier in Equation (1). This regression model allows the coefficients to differ across pre- 
and post-event periods, enabling me to test for changes in conservatism around these 
periods. As presented in Table 4, Panel A, I predict the coefficients on  86 ×     ×
    and  02 ×     ×     to be positive, while provide no sign prediction for the 
coefficient on  95 ×     ×     considering the opposite effect GAAP changes and 
PSLRA have on accounting conservatism in 1995. 
The results for the estimation of above equation are presented in Table 5. The first two 
columns show that the coefficient on  86 ×     ×     is significantly positive while 




conservatism of the full sample increases after the adoption of SAB 67 in 1986 but 
decreases by almost the same amount after 1995, presumably due to the effect of 
PSLRA. Following 2002, overall conservatism increases as shown in the positive and 
significant coefficient on  02 ×     ×    , indicating that newly adopted accounting 
standards along with the passage of SOX lead firms to report more conservatively as 
intended. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
To examine whether old and young firms exhibit different patterns across the event 
periods, I estimate equation (3) using two groups of samples respectively and report the 
results in the next four columns. The coefficient on  86 ×     ×     is significantly 
positive for both groups, but the magnitude and significance of the coefficient are more 
pronounced for old firms. It indicates that conservatism of both group increases 
following 1986, but the effect is greater for old firms then young firms consistent with 
prior studies that show large firm’s greater tendency to engage in restructuring activities 
(Bowman and Singh, 1990; Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993).  
The coefficient on  95 ×    ×     is negative and significant at the 1% level (-
0.108 with t = -6.120) for old firms, but is statistically insignificant for young firms. It 
indicates that following 1995, financial reporting of old firms becomes significantly less 
conservative than before while that of young firms does not change much. Thus, despite 
the adoption of two accounting standards that likely to result in more conservative 
reporting, conservatism decreases with the passage of PSLRA that considerably reduces 




given that large firms tend to have higher litigation risk (Khan and Watts, 2009) and that 
SFAS 121 is likely to have greater impact on young and high-tech firms whose 
economic condition is relatively unstable (Chandra, 2011) 
Finally, I find that the coefficient on  02 ×     ×     of old firms is 0.042 (t = 
2.21; p < 0.05), which is significantly positive but insufficient to cover the decline in 
conservatism across 1995. The coefficient of young firms is also positive and significant 
at the 1% level (0.064 with t = 6.38), with greater magnitude and significance compared 
to those of old firms. This result suggests that changes in GAAP along with the passage 
of SOX in 2002 play a role in increasing reporting conservatism, especially for young 
firms who are likely to be more affected by accounting standard (SFAS 142) that 
requires annual impairment test of goodwill and certain intangible assets. 
Taken together, changes in accounting standards are responsible for changes, 
especially increases, in conservatism, as most prior studies expect. However, changes in 
the demand for conservatism captured by regulation changes also play an important role 
in explaining conservatism trends, even to the extent of offsetting the effect of GAAP 
changes in 1995.  
 
4.3 Changes in firm’s economic environments 
In addition to the two explanations examined in the previous section, changes in the 
firm’s economic environments can be responsible for the observed conservatism trend as 
well. Given that my conservatism measure captures the incremental response to bad 




about firm’s economic environments such as operating losses and/or negative revenue 
growth may lead to more timely recognition of bad news. That is, if those events and 
negative stock returns are together regarded as an obvious indication of firm’s bad 
economic condition that is not going to be recovered in the near future, it may force 
managers and auditors to immediately recognize expenses in accordance with 
accounting standards. Contrastingly, managers may delay the recognition of expenses if 
there are no adverse economic events other than temporary negative stock returns. Thus, 
even when there’s no change in accounting standards or change in the demand for 
conservatism, changes in the firm’s economic environments can affect accounting 
conservatism. 
In this subsection, I cross-sectionally examine whether the incidence of economic 
events which represent firm’s bad economic environment is associated with the degree 
of reporting conservatism as I hypothesize. I then investigate whether the difference in 
conservatism trends between old and young firms is explained by different trends in the 
frequency of economic events that might lead to more conservative reporting. Following 
Donelson et al. (2011), I identify negative indicators of the firm’s economic 
environments using four variables: negative employee growth (Neg_Emp); discontinued 
operations (Disc); operating losses (Loss); negative revenue growth (Neg_Rev). These 
variables are likely to capture economic environment that is related to accounting 
conservatism, rather than to be affected by changes in accounting variables or by 
changes in the demand for conservatism (Donelson et al., 2011). I assign the value of 1 




events. To construct a comprehensive index that represents overall incidence of 
economic events, I add all four variables and label it Escore that ranges from 0 to 4. 
 
Empirical analysis 
To examine whether the existence of negative signals about firm’s economic 
environments reinforces accounting conservatism, I estimate the following cross-
sectional regression model: 
		    =    +       +       +      ×     +          +         ×     
+         ×     +          ×     ×    + controls +                (5) 
where Escore is calculated as described above, while other variables are as defined 
earlier. I predict the coefficient on       ×     ×     to be positive if earnings more 
timely reflect bad news with the firm’s negative economic events.  
Table 6, Panel A, shows the estimation results using full sample and each of two 
subsamples, old and young firms. The coefficient on       ×     ×     is 
significantly positive in any cases, indicating that the existence of negative economic 
events forces firms to make more conservative reporting. In addition, the coefficient of 
old firms is almost two times higher than that of young firms, suggesting that old firms 
are more responsive to the bad economic signals. Because old firms consist of large 
firms that are subject to more scrutiny from investors and creditors (Lobo and Zhou, 
2006), they are likely to report more conservatively when there are evident indications 
that the firm is in worse condition, presumably in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts. 




of negative economic events account for the changes in conservatism, Escore trend of 
young firms should show more increasing or less decreasing patterns over the study 
period compared to that of old firms. Table 6, Panel A, reports yearly average percentage 
of old and young firms that undergo each economic event and time trends of each event. 
In case of old firms, frequency of firms reporting discontinued operations has 
significantly increased, with positive and significant time trends (t = 6.03; p < 0.01), but 
frequency of firms reporting operating losses has significantly decreased (t = -3.64; p < 
0.01), thereby yielding no apparent trend in Escore over the last 33 years. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In case of young firms, frequency of firms reporting discontinued operations has 
increased similar to old firms, but the incidence of other three negative events have 
significantly declined over time, resulting in decreasing trend in Escore over time (Time 
Trend of E-Score, -0.011 with t = -2.73; p < 0.01). Changes in Escore are also 
graphically presented in Figure 3. Level of Escore is much higher for young firms in the 
1980s, but it shows similar patterns in the later period. Overall, young firms exhibit 
more decreasing trend in Escore than old firms, trends that are inconsistent with changes 
in conservatism. Thus, changes in the incidence of negative economic events do not 
seem to play an important role in explaining accounting conservatism trend.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
 
5. CONCLUSION 




over the last several decades. I first find that young firms who were listed after 1979 
show increasing trend in conservatism while old firms do not, suggesting that the 
increase in conservatism is primarily driven by newly listed firms into the firm 
population.   
I then examine why conservatism trends of old and young firms are different by 
discriminating between three potential explanations. The first is that changes in 
accounting standards are attributable to different conservatism trends between two 
groups, while the second is that changes in the demand for conservatism are attributable. 
By comparing conservatism measure before and after the event periods, I find that 
changes in accounting standards play a role in explaining increasing conservatism across 
1986 and 2002. More importantly, the effects of changes in accounting standards vary 
with firm characteristics. Specifically, the adoption of GAAP related to restructuring 
costs has greater impact on old firms while the adoption of GAAP related to impairment 
loss recognition of intangible assets has greater impact on young firms. However, in 
1995, the effect of reduced liability of managers and auditors following the passage of 
PSLRA offsets the effect of accounting standards, resulting in the decline in 
conservatism of old firms who are exposed to greater litigation costs. Although most 
prior studies largely focus on the role of accounting standards, my results suggest that 
changes in managerial reporting incentive are also important sources not to be 
underestimated. 
Finally, I examine whether the different trends in negative signals about firm’s 




old and young firms. The incidence of Escore, the proxy for negative economic 
environments, is positively associated with accounting conservatism, implying that it 
forces firms to report in a more conservative way. However, an investigation of trends in 
Escore shows that young firms exhibit more decreasing patterns that old firms, results 
that are not consistent with conservatism trends. Thus, changes in firm’s economic 
environments do not seem to be a primary reason for changes in conservatism in 
contrast with the former two explanations. 
My inferences are subject to several limitations. First, while the evidence provided in 
this study suggests that changes in GAAP and changes in the economic events 
contribute little to the increase in conservatism, my results do not necessarily mean that 
accounting standards and economic events play no role in the degree of conservatism. 
The three explanations are not mutually exclusive, and changes in the demand for 
conservatism do not fully explain the conservatism trend. Thus, it is possible that future 
study will develop stronger tests that are able to detect a role of real economic events.  
Second, since I estimate Basu (1997) conservatism measure using a cross-section of 
old versus young firms for each year, I assume that all firms in the same age group in 
year t are homogeneous. Thus, extreme observations could distort the annual 
conservatism measure, though I eliminate observations in the extreme 1 percent of the 
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DETAILED VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Earnings and Returns Variables and Components 
Earnings (X) 





Intangible Intensity (Intan) 
 
Capital Intensity (Capital) 
Growth (Growth) 
Loss dummy (Loss) 























IB, scaled by lagged market value 
Annual returns compounded from monthly returns beginning 
the fourth month after fiscal year end. 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if annual returns are negative, 0 
otherwise 
IB, scaled by total assets 
Selling, General, and Administrative expenses, scaled by 
average total assets 
Property, Plant and Equipment, scaled by total assets 
 
(Total assets – lagged total assets) / lagged total assets 
 
1 if operating income is negative, 0 otherwise 
 
Special items, scaled by average total assets 
 
   coefficients obtained from annual regression of  
 
equation (1) for old and young firms 
 
1 for 1980 to 33 for 2012 
 




















Annual average of the natural log of market value of equity 
across firms 
Annual average leverage across firms, where leverage is long-
term debt plus short term debt deflated by market value of 
equity 
Annual average M/B across firms, where M/B is the ratio of 
market value of equity to book value of equity 
Accounting Standard Variables 
Dxx = 1 in 19xx or 20xx and beyond, and 0 prior to 19xx or 20xx. 
 
Economic Event Variables 
Negative Employee Growth (Neg_Emp) 
Discontinued Operations (Disc) 
Operating Loss (Loss) 











1 if the firm had negative employee growth 
1 if the firm had discontinued operations 
1 if the firm had negative operating income 
1 if the firm had negative revenue growth 
Sum of the four indicator variables 
Neg_Emp, Disc, Loss, and Neg_Rev 















β2 β3 β2 β3 
    =    +       +       +          + controls +         
Full Sample 
1980 3053 0.034  0.234     
1981 3092 0.105  0.133     
1982 3328 0.021  0.093     
1983 3442 0.013  0.231     
1984 3691 0.057  0.216     
1985 3707 0.030  0.307     
1986 3716 0.007  0.297     
1987 3899 -0.011  0.274  1980-1987 0.032 0.223  
1988 3990 0.040  0.309     
1989 3920 0.027  0.362     
1990 3584 0.002  0.275     
1991 3582 0.001  0.386     
1992 3633 0.032  0.170     
1993 3879 0.028  0.147     
1994 4206 0.016  0.182     
1995 4407 -0.004  0.211  1988-1995 0.018 0.255 
1996 4618 0.025  0.175     
1997 4903 0.017  0.164     
1998 4736 -0.046  0.188     
1999 4443 -0.024  0.192     
2000 4656 0.012  0.201     
2001 4525 0.007  0.353     
2002 4210 0.022  0.301     
2003 3968 -0.035  0.564  1996-2003 -0.003 0.267 
2004 3856 0.020  0.223     
2005 3779 -0.003  0.230     
2006 3714 -0.009  0.275     
2007 3608 0.013  0.238     
2008 3585 0.018  0.258     
2009 3391 -0.057  0.373     
2010 3255 0.004  0.256     
2011 3217 -0.030  0.250     
2012 3019 0.006  0.382  2004-2012 -0.004  0.276  
       
Time Trend       
Coeff  -0.002*** 0.003*    
t-stat  -3.73 1.70    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Variables of interest and their statistics are indicated in bold typeface.  





Controls include lagged sales revenue, lagged earnings, log of beginning-of-year market 
capitalization, log of beginning-of-year share price, beginning-of-year book-to-market ratio, and 







Descriptive Statistics and Industry Composition 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Old vs. Young Firms  
 
 




Old Firms Young Firms 
n weight n weight 
1 Agriculture 208  0% 286  0% 
2 Food Products 1,371  3% 1,094  1% 
3 Candy and Soda 82  0% 237  0% 
4 Beer Liquor 205  0% 284  0% 
5 Tobacco Products 74  0% 43  0% 
6 Recreation 493  1% 675  1% 
7 Entertainment 552  1% 1,525  2% 
8 Printing and Publishing 696  1% 491  1% 
9 Consumer Goods 1,538  3% 1,131  1% 
10 Apparel 973  2% 1,022  1% 
11 Healthcare 356  1% 1,982  3% 
12 Medical Equipment 893  2% 3,500  5% 
13 Pharmaceutical Products 885  2% 5,933  8% 
14 Chemicals 1,487  3% 1,277  2% 
15 Rubber and Plastic Products 737  1% 681  1% 
16 Textiles 610  1% 325  0% 
17 Construction Materials 2,124  4% 1,021  1% 
18 Construction 836  2% 846  1% 
19 Steel Works Etc 1,144  2% 967  1% 
20 Fabricated Products 369  1% 212  0% 
21 Machinery 2,794  6% 2,399  3% 
22 Electrical Equipment 1,275  3% 1,115  1% 
23 Automobiles and Trucks 1,104  2% 1,023  1% 
Variable 




Q1 Median Q3 Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Q1 Median Q3 
Returns 0.162  0.485  -0.130  0.101  0.364  0.105  0.693  -0.331  -0.017  0.357  
Earnings 0.046  0.152  0.026  0.067  0.107  -0.028  0.198  -0.066  0.026  0.069  
ROA 0.032  0.146  0.014  0.043  0.073  -0.064  0.408  -0.074  0.023  0.069  
Size 5.235  2.308  3.458  5.195  6.971  4.956  2.104  3.418  4.862  6.388  
Leverage 0.664  0.955  0.115  0.355  0.826  0.462  1.007  0.005  0.128  0.480  
M/B 1.990  2.000  0.986  1.510  2.349  2.892  3.240  1.168  2.005  3.536  
Intan 0.243  2.341  0.127  0.204  0.297  0.350  4.346  0.155  0.283  0.455  
Capital 0.370  0.233  0.188  0.315  0.533  0.280  0.247  0.083  0.194  0.419  
Growth 0.102  0.637  -0.024  0.064  0.161  0.301  1.688  -0.062  0.093  0.285  
Loss 0.126  0.332  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.329  0.470  0.000  0.000  1.000  




24 Aircraft 581  1% 176  0% 
25 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 139  0% 113  0% 
26 Defense 148  0% 122  0% 
27 Precious Metals 332  1% 1,099  1% 
28 Non and &sic le Metallic and  
Industrial Metal Mining 
340  1% 657  1% 
29 Coal 59  0% 176  0% 
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 2,603  5% 4,127  5% 
31 Utilities 4,857  10% 748  1% 
32 Communication 1,043  2% 2,855  4% 
33 Personal Services 472  1% 987  1% 
34 Business Services 2,678  5% 11,505  15% 
35 Computers 1,346  3% 4,286  6% 
36 Electronic Equipment 3,052  6% 5,579  7% 
37 Measuring and Control  
Equipment 
1,346  3% 1,949  3% 
38 Business Supplies 1,524  3% 622  1% 
39 Shipping Containers 274  1% 171  0% 
40 Transportation 1,326  3% 2,369  3% 
41 Wholesale 2,354  5% 2,968  4% 
42 Retail 2,849  6% 4,382  6% 
43 Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels 970  2% 1,765  2% 
48 Almost Nothing 640  1% 1,513  2% 







Difference in Conservatism Trends between Old and Young Firms 
 
Panel A: Annual OLS Estimation of Regression Equations with Annual Earnings - Old vs. 
Young firms 




Coefficients No. of 
Firms 
Coefficients 
β2 β3 β2 β3 
    =    +       +       +          + controls +     
1980 3,005  0.033  0.240  48  0.076  0.049  
1981 2,925  0.105  0.145  167  0.081  -0.019  
1982 2,907  0.030  0.100  421  0.018  0.068  
1983 2,857  0.024  0.231  585  -0.027  0.196  
1984 2,698  0.069  0.285  993  0.032  0.142  
1985 2,504  0.045  0.405  1,203  0.025  0.200  
1986 2,309  0.020  0.430  1,407  0.023  0.195  
1987 2,130  0.014  0.328  1,769  -0.008  0.211  
1988 1,959  0.048  0.413  2,031  0.048  0.246  
1989 1,829  0.043  0.428  2,091  0.046  0.270  
1990 1,656  0.016  0.269  1,928  0.018  0.212  
1991 1,593  0.009  0.515  1,989  0.010  0.312  
1992 1,540  0.060  0.201  2,093  0.025  0.171  
1993 1,472  0.041  0.181  2,407  0.030  0.124  
1994 1,453  0.016  0.246  2,753  0.023  0.145  
1995 1,428  0.027  0.289  2,979  -0.002  0.180  
1996 1,357  0.021  0.256  3,261  0.028  0.146  
1997 1,281  0.040  0.131  3,622  0.016  0.153  
1998 1,206  0.007  0.135  3,530  -0.047  0.178  
1999 1,121  -0.031  0.205  3,322  -0.019  0.181  
2000 1,064  0.008  0.269  3,592  0.018  0.184  
2001 985  0.009  0.462  3,540  0.015  0.309  
2002 949  0.036  0.393  3,261  0.042  0.243  
2003 906  -0.008  0.289  3,062  -0.026  0.584  
2004 877  0.054  0.175  2,979  0.016  0.212  
2005 838  0.029  0.213  2,941  -0.002  0.208  
2006 814  0.028  0.147  2,900  -0.004  0.255  
2007 757  0.055  0.197  2,851  0.007  0.226  
2008 725  0.100  0.164  2,860  -0.001  0.267  
2009 702  -0.027  0.154  2,689  -0.057  0.287  
2010 682  0.041  0.464  2,573  0.008  0.233  
2011 663  0.034  0.252  2,554  -0.033  0.234  
2012 637  0.081  0.378  2,382  -0.007  0.363  
       
Time Trend       
Coeff  0.000 -0.001  -0.002*** 0.006*** 





Panel B: Differences in Conservatism Trends between Old and Young Firms 
    Coeff.  t-stat.  
C_Scoret =    + γ Trendt +   Dummy_Youngt +   Dummy_Youngt × Trendt +    
Intercept 
 










-0.170 *** -3.310 
 
Dummy_Young * Trend 
 





   
Adjusted R-square (%)   16.00%       
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Variables of interest and their statistics are indicated in bold typeface.  





***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Variables of interest and their statistics are indicated in bold typeface.  
Time Trend is coefficient and t-statistics are obtained by regressing 33 annual coefficients on the 
year. 
Controls include lagged sales revenue, lagged earnings, log of beginning-of-year market 
capitalization, log of beginning-of-year share price, beginning-of-year book-to-market ratio, and 






Summary of accounting standards and other regulation changes  
and their hypothesized effects on conservatism 
 
Year Event Description 
Effects on conservatism 
Old Firm Young Firm 
1986 SAB 67 requires restructurings to be disclosed 
separately if material 
(++) (+) 
1995 SFAS 121 requiring long-lived assets and certain 
intangibles to be reviewed for 
recoverability if there is any indication 
of impairment and to be reported at the 
lower value amount 
(+) (++) 
 EITF 94-3 provides guidance for the first time on 
the recognition of a liability and 
expense associated with restructuring 
activities 
(++) (+) 
  PSLRA eliminates joint and several liabilities 
under which auditors and other related 
parties could be named to lawsuits 
(--) (-) 
2002 SFAS 142 eliminates goodwill amortization and 
requires that goodwill be evaluated 
yearly for possible impairment  
(+) (++) 
  SOX imposes significant criminal penalties 
on CEOs/CFOs for knowingly 
certifying financial statements that do 








The Role of Accounting Standards and Demand for Conservatism 
Panel A: Pooled regression of Basu (1997) model for 4 periods 
Period 
Average of Yearly β3 
of Old Firms 
 Diff.  
Average of Yearly β3 
of Young Firms 
 Diff. 
1980-1985 0.239  
   
0.143  
  














2002-2012 0.279    0.052    0.275   0.065  
β3 is annual coefficient from estimations of the following model:\ 
 
    =    +       +       +          + controls +          
 
The models are OLS annual cross-sectional regressions from 1980-2012.            





Panel B: Regressions Comparing Conservatism Measure across Event Periods 
  All Firms Old Firms Young Firms 
  Coeff.  t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat. 
Intercept 0.083 *** 37.640 0.093 *** 48.140 0.005 
 
0.790 
Dt -0.027 *** -6.640 -0.019 *** -5.290 -0.031 *** -2.850 
          
Rt 0.019 *** 6.220 0.025 *** 9.180 0.003  
0.390 




Rt x D95 -0.027 *** -6.970 -0.018 *** -2.610 -0.030 *** -6.010 
Rt x D02 -0.032 *** -12.360 -0.023 *** -3.670 -0.034 *** -11.150 
          
Dt x Rt 0.236 *** 22.840 0.247 *** 24.050 0.143 *** 6.580 
Dt x Rt x D86 0.038 *** 2.960 0.097 *** 6.430 0.069 *** 2.880 
Dt x Rt x D95 -0.037 *** -3.890 -0.108 *** -6.120 -0.001  
-0.070 
Dt x Rt x D02 0.064 *** 7.540 0.042 ** 2.210 0.064 *** 6.380 
          
D86 -0.048 *** -16.890 -0.041 *** -14.480 -0.006 
 
-0.810 
D95 -0.006 ** -2.400 0.005 
 





-1.290 0.006 ** 2.030 
          
Dt x D86 0.024 *** 4.730 0.027 *** 5.380 0.030 ** 2.540 












                    








12.73%     13.72%     10.66%     
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Variables of interest and their statistics are indicated in bold typeface.  
This table presents results from estimations of the following model: 
 
    =    +       +       +      ×     +    86 +    95 +    86 +    86 ×      
+    95 ×     +    02 ×     +     86 ×     +     95 ×     +     02 ×      
+     86 ×     ×     +     95 ×     ×     +     02 ×     ×     + controls +     
 






The Role of Economic Events 
Panel A: Association between Escore and conservatism measure 
  All Firms Old Firms Young Firms 
  Coeff.  t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat. 
Intercept 0.079 *** 68.560 0.092 *** 62.670 0.049 *** 28.640 





          
R 0.019 *** 12.800 0.047 *** 19.930 0.017 *** 8.860 
R x Escore -0.036 *** -39.070 -0.028 *** -18.100 -0.033 *** -29.160 
          
D x R 0.099 *** 19.160 0.039 *** 4.580 0.092 *** 14.000 
D x R x Escore 0.072 *** 25.460 0.109 *** 23.300 0.054 *** 15.130 
          
Escore -0.041 *** -52.400 -0.030 *** -29.040 -0.051 *** -45.820 
D x Escore -0.012 *** -9.230 -0.008 *** -4.660 -0.007 *** -3.810 
                    








24.21%     23.94%     24.15%     
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
Variables of interest and their statistics are indicated in bold typeface.  
This table presents results from estimations of the following model: 
 
    =    +       +       +      ×     +          +         ×     
+         ×     +          ×     ×     + controls +      
 




Panel B: Changes in the Incidence of Economic Events for Old and Young Firms 
Year 









% of Loss 
firms 
(Loss) 






Old Young Old Young Old Young Old Young Old Young 
1980 0.45  0.67  0.14  0.04  0.08  0.27  0.25  0.75  0.93  1.73  
1981 0.44  0.58  0.16  0.05  0.10  0.37  0.23  0.62  0.94  1.62  
1982 0.58  0.56  0.11  0.04  0.17  0.46  0.46  0.60  1.32  1.66  
1983 0.38  0.41  0.10  0.04  0.16  0.46  0.33  0.46  0.98  1.37  
1984 0.34  0.44  0.11  0.05  0.14  0.43  0.20  0.42  0.79  1.35  
1985 0.41  0.43  0.14  0.07  0.17  0.41  0.38  0.39  1.09  1.30  
1986 0.44  0.40  0.14  0.07  0.18  0.43  0.38  0.39  1.13  1.30  
1987 0.38  0.36  0.13  0.06  0.17  0.40  0.28  0.36  0.96  1.18  
1988 0.37  0.35  0.14  0.07  0.16  0.36  0.23  0.31  0.89  1.09  
1989 0.42  0.36  0.14  0.08  0.15  0.38  0.26  0.31  0.97  1.12  
1990 0.47  0.39  0.12  0.06  0.14  0.33  0.31  0.33  1.03  1.11  
1991 0.51  0.40  0.11  0.05  0.15  0.31  0.44  0.39  1.21  1.15  
1992 0.48  0.35  0.09  0.05  0.12  0.29  0.32  0.34  1.01  1.03  
1993 0.44  0.35  0.10  0.05  0.11  0.29  0.29  0.33  0.93  1.02  
1994 0.42  0.33  0.09  0.05  0.10  0.28  0.22  0.28  0.82  0.94  
1995 0.41  0.36  0.11  0.05  0.10  0.29  0.24  0.29  0.86  0.98  
1996 0.38  0.30  0.11  0.05  0.08  0.28  0.24  0.29  0.80  0.92  
1997 0.35  0.33  0.13  0.05  0.08  0.31  0.24  0.32  0.80  1.02  
1998 0.35  0.32  0.11  0.06  0.11  0.32  0.31  0.32  0.88  1.01  
1999 0.39  0.34  0.13  0.07  0.10  0.32  0.30  0.30  0.93  1.02  
2000 0.40  0.34  0.14  0.08  0.10  0.40  0.24  0.29  0.88  1.11  
2001 0.55  0.49  0.14  0.08  0.14  0.46  0.50  0.46  1.33  1.50  
2002 0.55  0.49  0.22  0.10  0.13  0.39  0.53  0.44  1.43  1.43  
2003 0.51  0.44  0.26  0.12  0.11  0.33  0.25  0.29  1.13  1.17  
2004 0.37  0.30  0.30  0.14  0.09  0.28  0.16  0.20  0.92  0.93  
2005 0.37  0.32  0.33  0.16  0.08  0.29  0.19  0.26  0.98  1.03  
2006 0.36  0.33  0.37  0.16  0.07  0.29  0.20  0.24  1.00  1.03  
2007 0.35  0.33  0.35  0.16  0.09  0.32  0.25  0.28  1.04  1.10  
2008 0.47  0.43  0.30  0.15  0.13  0.34  0.34  0.35  1.24  1.28  
2009 0.68  0.53  0.25  0.15  0.16  0.33  0.76  0.59  1.84  1.61  
2010 0.39  0.29  0.24  0.15  0.08  0.25  0.24  0.24  0.96  0.93  
2011 0.31  0.29  0.26  0.13  0.06  0.24  0.21  0.25  0.84  0.90  
2012 0.35  0.34  0.26  0.15  0.06  0.26  0.37  0.34  1.05  1.10  
           
Time Trend          
Coeff 0.000 -0.004 0.006 0.004 
-
0.002 
-0.003 0.001 -0.007 0.005 -0.011 
t-stat -0.34 -2.83 6.03 8.49 -3.64 -3.39 0.40 -3.44 1.21 -2.73 
Time Trend is coefficient and t-statistics are obtained by regressing 33 annual variables on the 







Trend in Conservatism – Full Sample 


















Trend in Conservatism – Old vs. Young Firms 
33 annual coefficients, 1980-2012 
 
Panel A: Positive News Timeliness (β2) 
 
































The Incidence of Economic Events – Old vs. Young Firms 
















회계보수주의는 지난 수십년 간 증가하는 추세를 보이는데, 이러한 변화가 왜 발생
한 것인지에 해서는 아직 명확히 알려진 바가 없다. 나는 이러한 회계보수주의의 
증가추세가 시장에 새로이 진출한 은 기업들에 의해 견인되었음을 발견했다. 한 
나는 성숙한 기업과 은 기업 간의 보수주의 추세가 서로 다른 양상을 보이는 것이 
회계기 의 변화 때문인지, 보수주의에 한 수요의 변화 때문인지, 혹은 회사의 경
제환경 변화에 따른 것인지 분석하 다. 연구결과에 따르면, 부분의 기존연구에서 
상했듯이 새로운 회계기 의 도입 후로 보수주의가 증가했다. 그러나 이뿐 아니
라 보수주의에 한 수요 변화 역시 보수주의의 변화를 설명하는 주요 요인으로 작
용했다. 반면 회사의 경제환경 변화는 보수주의와는 직  련이 은 것으로 판
단된다. 
 
주요어: 회계보수주의, 회계기 , 보수주의에 한 수요, 규제, 경제환경 
 
학번: 2013-20492 
